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Book Review
JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, by Robert P. 
Merges 1
IKECHI MGBEOJI 2
IT IS CURIOUS THAT AFTER more than four centuries of troubled existence3 and 
repeated assertions of its indispensability to innovation in society,4 the intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) regime inspires a compulsive need to justify its place in 
society. In the face of empirical agnosticism,5 the advocacy for IPRs regimes6 and 
the regular makeover7 required for their justifi cation often raise more questions 
than answers. Robert Merges’s Justifying Intellectual Property is the latest attempt 
at providing a coherent justifi cation for the IPRs regime. 
Th e histories of the most theorized IPRs—patents and copyrights—can be 
described as anthologies of blackmail8 and exaggeration of the purported benefi ts 
1. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) 405 pages.
2. Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Ontario.  
3. See generally Frederick Abbott, Th omas Cottier & Francis Gurry, Th e International 
Intellectual Property System: Commentary and Materials (Th e Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999).
4. Robert M Sherwood, Intellectual Property and Economic Development (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1990).
5. US, Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee 
on the Judiciary, An Economic Review of the Patent System (Washington: US Government 
Printing Offi  ce, 1958); Edith Tilton Penrose, Th e Economics of the International Patent System 
(Baltimore: Th e Johns Hopkins Press, 1951) at 76-98.
6. Robert M Sherwood, Vanda Scartezini & Peter Dirk Siemsen, “Promotion of Inventiveness 
In Developing Countries Th rough a More Advanced Patent Administration” (1999) 39:4 
JL & Tech 473.
7. David Vaver, “Sprucing Up Patent Law” (2010) 23:1 IPJ 63. 
8. Owen Lippert, “One Trip to the Dentist is Enough: Reasons to Strengthen Intellectual 
Property Rights through the Free Trade Area of the Americas Now” in Owen Lippert, ed, 
Competitive Strategies for the Protection of Intellectual Property (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 
1999) 125 at 131; Bruce Willis Bugbee, Th e Early American Law of Intellectual Property: 
Th e Historical Foundations of the United States Patent and Copyright Systems (Ann Arbor: 
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of a robust IPRs regime.9 Society is often threatened, at least implicitly, with 
technological and artistic stagnation or deterioration if a strong IPRs regime is 
not implemented.10 Since Brunelleschi’s confrontation with the City of Florence 
to procure the fi rst patent, the trajectory of the IPRs system has been uneven, 
but ultimately successful with the emergence of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) as a global benchmark. Amidst 
travails and remarkable successes for IPRs regimes, advocacy for strong IPRs regimes 
has largely rested on overstated benefi ts and hype.
Take for instance the copyrights regime: emerging from the theatrics of and 
turf wars between printers and publishers in England, it was not designed to 
protect authors and writers.11 Although signifi cant progress has been made in 
accommodating the needs of authors,12 it is common knowledge that even today, 
few authors, especially academic writers, live off  their royalties.13
Two questions remain. First, is it justifi able to have property in ideas? 
Th e second question asks whether private property in ideas, as defi ned by 
contemporary IPRs laws, accounts for the socio-cultural dimensions of creativity 
and the debts owed by authors and innovators to information already in the public 
domain, from which innovation and creativity emanate. Scholarly justifi cation 
for the propertization of ideas14 has tended to resemble martyrdom—an act of 
faith. Th e philosophical and policy challenges presented by the propertization 
of ideas are so well-documented,15 one wonders why a highly respected scholar 
like Robert Merges would tilt at the windmills of philosophical resistance to the 
propertization of ideas. Is Justifying Intellectual Property an act of courage or folly?
University Microfi lms, 1961) at 76.
9. Giuseppina D’Agostino, Copyright, Contract, Creators: New Media, New Rules (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2010) ch 3.
10. See Ikechi Mgbeoji, “TRIPS and TRIPS-Plus Impacts in Africa” in Daniel L Gervais, ed, 
Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in a 
TRIPS-Plus Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 259. 
11. Brad Sherman & Lionel Bently, Th e Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law: Th e British 
Experience, 1760-1911 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 123.
12. Robert P Merges, Peter S Menell & Mark A Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New 
Technological Age, 5th ed (Austin: Aspen, 2010) at 504-508.
13. Indeed, the use of regal terms such as “royalty” to characterize an otherwise impoverished 
remuneration would seem to be a deliberate joke, particularly on academic writers and authors.
14. Margaret Jane Radin, “A Comment on Information Propertization and its Legal Milieu” 
(2006) 54:1-2 Clev St L Rev 23.
15. See e.g. Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: Th e Rise of Intellectual Property and 
How It Th reatens Creativity (New York: New York University Press, 2001).
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Merges himself provides a glimpse of his motivation:
I had reached a point where I needed to disrupt the scholarly rhythm I had fallen 
into ... . I wanted to take on something bigger, more sustained; to go back to the 
dugout, pick up a bigger bat, and swing from the heels. Th is book is the result of 
that fateful, and very foolish, decision.16 
Th is is not a foolish book.
With inspired zeal, intellect, and a broad vision, Merges proceeds to “defend 
IP rights against a host of charges leveled in recent years … .”17 He provides an 
account of mischief allegedly attributable to IPRs and describes critics’ claims that 
they are no longer necessary in a digital age, that the fi eld of IP is an incoherent 
tangle of made up rationales and half-baked theories, and that IP is not really 
property at all. Although these are weighty critiques, Merges undertakes to do 
more than defend the besmirched honour of IPRs. He sets an ambitious goal of 
suggesting ways in which the regime of IPRs could be “trimmed and tailored to 
better serve its main purpose, which [is] … protecting creative works as a way of 
honoring and rewarding creative people.”18
Th e book is an impressive 405 pages of meticulous research and is divided 
into three interlinked themes. Th e fi rst theme deals with the theoretical 
foundations of IPRs; the second focuses on the mid-level principles of IPRs; and 
the third details the emerging issues of IPRs. Th ese three themes are discussed in 
ten chapters spanning just over 300 pages, and the book concludes with a section 
that contemplates the future of IPRs.
Th e supreme virtue of the book is its readability. Unlike many philosophical 
texts that seemingly take pride in being impenetrable and dense, Merges writes 
in a clear and engaging fashion. Substantively, Merges fi rst examines the Kantian 
conception of property, which conceivably lends itself to a balanced theoretical 
basis for IPRs by off ering a common ground between creators and users of IP. 
Kant’s theory is further explicated by Rawls’s concept of distributional justice.19 
More importantly, both Kant and Rawls off er a framework that, while not quite a 
universal construct, has the attractive quality of being mid-level, as both Kant and 
Rawls straddle the divide between foundational doctrines and the harsh reality 
of factual details. Much IP theory has foundered on the rocks of factual details. 
16. Supra note 1 at ix.
17. Ibid. 
18. Ibid at ix. 
19. See John Rawls, A Th eory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1971); John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 1st ed by Erin Kelly (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001).
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Indeed, a substantial aspect of Merges’ contribution is his masterful explication 
of the proportionality principle: that is, the idea of rewards proportioned to eff ort 
or value. 
Despite this principle’s obvious attraction, critics may wonder whether 
“information feudalism”20 (a likely consequence of a rentier or license economy) 
squares with proportionality, or whether the proportionality principle means 
much to the many inventors whose inventions did not make it to the market. 
What does proportionality do for the failed writers whose sleepless nights with 
their muse were never rewarded with a bestseller listing, let alone a royalty? Th e 
whims and idiosyncrasies of the marketplace as well as luck are signifi cant factors 
left untreated by the proportionality argument.21 
Merges seeks to avoid the constraints of fundamentalist dogma on IP by 
borrowing from and expanding on a vocabulary that both transcends and ties 
together multiple foundational concepts. By looking at the works of Kant, Rawls, 
Coleman, Waldron, and other philosophers for inspiration and insight, Merges 
creates a safe space for dialogue and argumentation between those who believe 
in the propertization of ideas and those with a diff erent view. Th e question of 
whether the “propertization of labour” is consistent with the nature and function 
of IP makes two fundamental and contestable assumptions: that there is always 
an “intellectual” component in intellectual property and if there is, that such 
intellectual input or intervention is akin to “property.”22 Merges concedes that 
other scholars have questioned these assumptions.23 
Th ere are many forms of IP that cannot lay legitimate claim to being the 
result of extraordinary intellectual intervention by their owners or that require 
intellectual merit for legal protection. An obvious example is a trademark. 
Conversely, there are profound intellectual interventions that IP law does not 
protect for policy reasons—examples are found in mathematics and theoretical 
physics. Moreover, in dominant forms of IP law, there are cultural prejudices that 
privilege western intellectual work over non-western innovations. For example, 
20. See Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge 
Economy? (London: Earthscan, 2002); Martin Kretschmer, “Feudalism, Retreat or 
Revolution?” (Paper delivered at Bournemouth University Centre for IP Policy & 
Management, 26 June 2001), [unpublished] online: <http://eprints.bournemouth.
ac.uk/3010/1/martin.pdf>.
21. Ikechi Mgbeoji, Global Biopiracy: Patents, Plants and Indigenous Knowledge (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2006) at 35-36.
22. Supra note 1 at 197. 
23. Giuseppe Mazziotti, EU Digital Copyright Law and the End-User (Springer: Berlin, 2008) at 16-18. 
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Indigenous and traditional knowledge does not yet enjoy legal protection.24 Th is 
raises signifi cant questions about the universality and even-handed nature of the 
philosophical foundations of IPRs. 
Th e second assumption is that “creations of the mind” are akin to physical 
property, and as such, the legal principles and doctrines of property law may 
be adapted to suit the vagaries and peculiarities of the former.25 In the context 
of privatization and conferral of property rights over creations of the mind, the 
fear is that absent property rights, creative minds would cease to be creative. Of 
course, this subtle blackmail fails to take into account the non-rivalrous nature 
of IPRs and more importantly, the experiential truth that property rights are not 
the only motivations or incentives for creativity. In western legal tradition, few 
principles have attained the divine status enjoyed by individual property rights. 
Th e theology of property as a right of unquestioned merit has in some ways 
bred a fundamentalist concept of property. It is therefore to be expected that 
creations of the mind would be dragged to the altar of property for initiation. Th e 
question remains, however, whether creations of the mind are of the same kind 
as physical property. Merges himself observes: “To begin, I must concede that on 
one narrow view of what ‘property’ is, I cannot succeed.”26 Th is, of course, refers 
to the historical essentialist concept of property as a tangible, physical thing, with 
attendant legal characteristics dissimilar to ideas. Th is may also be referred to as 
the Blackstonian concept of property as absolute dominion.27
Merges’ candor in this book disarms the potential critic. He proceeds to 
posit an adaptable concept of property, expansive enough to account for both 
tangible and intangible ‘property.’ By mapping out a one-to-one concept of 
power relations between the owner and the user, Merges seems to escape the 
constraints imposed by a historical essentialist view of property. However, this 
expansion of the concept of property is problematic. At what stage does an idea 
metamorphose into property, and what is the principled basis for this alleged 
transfi guration? Although arguments surrounding effi  ciency and the supposed 
need to preserve the public domain are expertly tackled by Merges, the problem 
here is that the non-rivalrous nature of IPRs renders invalid the imaginary fears 
of “a tragedy of the commons”28 with respect to IPRs. 
24. Mgbeoji, supra note 21 at 120-68. 
25. But see Peter Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996) at 
97-100. 
26. Supra note 1 at 4. 
27. I am grateful to Dr Carys Craig for reminding me of this alternate interpretation.
28. See Garrett Hardin, “Th e Tragedy of the Commons” (1968) 162:3859 Science 1243 (referring 
to the tragic deterioration which is inevitable in the unregulated use of a common resource). 
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Merges’ method of resolving this problem is to proceed from the mid-level 
principles then to approach the deontological question. IPRs theorists distinguish 
between essentialist notions of property and mid-level principles. Th e former 
refer to the argument of whether IPRs are like ‘real’ property—no adaption of 
the concept of property is permissible in this formulation. On the other hand, 
mid-level principles focus on the conception and characteristics of property 
rights with a view to adapting those characteristics to create or sustain new 
manifestations or notions of property. Interestingly, the mid-level principles—
non-removal, proportionality, effi  ciency, and dignity—are largely independent of 
the fundamental justifi cation for IPRs.29 Merges’ approach results in the scenario 
in which IPRs may be justifi ed on the basis of the four pillars constituting the 
mid-level principles. What, then, are the “fi rst-order principles”?30 Drawing from 
Jules Coleman, Rawls, Locke, Kant, and Justin Hughes, Merges lays down three 
foundational principles: Lockean appropriation, Kantian (liberal) individualism, 
and Rawlsian attention to the distributive eff ects of property.31 Ultimately, these 
arguments are premised on possessive individualism.
On Locke, especially when considering the when and how of the 
transfi guration of ideas into property, Merges seeks to make a distinction between 
applying one’s labour to a thing on the one hand and mixing one’s labour with 
a thing, on the other. Th rough this archeological excavation and re-reading of 
Lockean philosophy, Merges seeks to restore Locke’s account of appropriation 
by arguing that what Locke meant in his writings was that property is grounded 
in the application of labour. By asking how much labour was involved, and how 
the pre-existing thing changed or was aff ected by labour, Locke justifi es the 
existence of property rights over the resulting product of labour. Is this really 
a reformulation of Locke, or crass semantics? If it is the former, then this is 
arguably an egalitarian and secular reading of Locke.32 However, we must note 
that the Lockean argument is ineluctably theological and thus problematic for a 
secular society such as ours.33 
Be that as it may, the distinction between mixing labour with property and 
applying labour to create property goes only so far. It is self-evident that not all 
eff orts give rise to property rights and, more importantly, equal expenditures 
29. Supra note 1 at 139. 
30. Ibid at 13. 
31. Ibid. 
32. See John Dunn, Th e Political Th ought of John Locke: A Historical Account of the Argument of 
the ‘Two Treatises of Government’ (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1969). 
33. Gopal Sreenivasan, Th e Limits of Lockean Rights in Property (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995) at 4.
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of eff ort do not give rise to equal property claims. If Locke’s philosophy was 
the fi rst foundation, how do we justify intellectual property rights that accrue 
to shareholders of companies, even when the shareholders are unaware of the 
copyrights, trademarks, and patents that bear their names? What eff ort of theirs 
was applied to the thing to create the property? Is their shareholding to be 
construed as eff ort or labour? It seems that Locke is inadequate in explaining 
modern realities on the propertization of ideas.34
Th e dominance of large corporations in the business of IP ownership is 
well documented. While not entirely sympathetic to the view that the era of 
the mythical lone inventor is gone, Merges struggles with justifying corporate 
ownership of IP rights at the expense of the individual creator.35 He recognizes that 
corporate IP holders are not ideal “creator collectives”;36 in attempting to mitigate 
this, he argues that legal rules must be tilted in favour of individual creators. On 
the same basis, Merges makes an argument for a liberal interpretation of the 
“rules of exit”37 for employees whose intellectual property has been owned or used 
by their corporate employers. In his words, “IP claims by large corporate entities 
should be carefully scrutinized to ensure they are not being used to prevent the 
formation of legitimate start-up companies.”38 Given the strengthened position 
of corporate IP owners in the creeping era of information feudalism, Merges’ 
assertion must be construed as a wish, rather than an expectation.
On Kant, Merges notes that “the basic foundations of IP law are individual 
autonomy and freedom.”39 Kant’s deontological approach to philosophy off ers 
Merges a context for understanding the more complicated vistas of IPRs. 
What did Merges see through this lens? While viewing the fi eld of IP as one 
occupied by individuals in their most autonomous state of expression may help 
to justify individual ownership in western traditions, it also helps to explain the 
resistance of major forms of IP to recognize the enormous debt owed by creators 
and innovators to society and its accumulated wisdom. Th e lionization of the 
individual innovator and creator disparages the common pool of knowledge, 
experience, and know-how from which every innovation, creation, and ingenuity 
springs. As Malcolm Gladwell and other scholars of innovation have repeatedly 
34. For a fuller discussion, see Carys J Craig, “Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author’s Right: A 
Warning against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law” (2002) 28:1 Queen’s LJ 1 at 28. 
35. Supra note 1 at 31-67. 
36. Ibid at 22. 
37. Th ese are legal rules and doctrines that control how easy it is for an employee to leave a large 
company and start a new company. See supra note 1 at 23. 
38. Ibid. 
39. Ibid at 15.
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pointed out, there is a cultural, social, and historical context to every innovation.40 
Kant places the individual in the center of his philosophical universe. Th e notion 
of possessive individualism pervading the Kantian approach is very problematic. 
Th e dominant conception of IPRs as private property fails to account 
for or refl ect the realities of cultural creativity.41 Th e dialogic and interactive 
nature of innovation and creativity is compromised in favour of glorifying 
the individual; however, every innovator or creator owes a debt of capital 
to the commons. As Isaac Newton memorably put it, “If I have seen a little 
further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants.”42 Merges, like so many 
other infl uential western scholars, downplays the cultural and historical 
contingencies of IPRs, especially the social contexts in which creativity and 
innovation operate. It is remarkable that this intensely western construct of 
individual authorship (the independent originator) has achieved universal 
status despite overwhelming evidence from all parts of the globe that 
creativity and innovation are socially and culturally contingent. A system in 
which full property rights are granted over the whole, simply because of a 
minuscule improvement to a part of that whole, is theoretically suspect and 
morally problematic.
Read in conjunction, neither Locke nor Kant off ers a comprehensive 
justifi cation for IPRs as being analogous to property rights. To fi ll this 
gap, Merges turns to Rawls’s infl uential works on property and distributive 
justice. Rawls and other thinkers have “argue[d] persuasively that dedicated 
development and application of talent gives rise to a legitimate desert claim.”43 
Th e profound brilliance of Rawls’s foundational idea is the predicate “that 
much individual action is the result of pervasive social infl uence, so that 
society too has a legitimate interest—but not a coequal right—in the results of 
individual initiative.”44 Rawls fi lls a signifi cant hole in the theses of Kant and 
Locke. Merges’s explication and detailed analysis of this aspect of IP theory is 
40. Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers: Th e Story of Success (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 
2008); Malcolm Gladwell, Th e Tipping Point: How Little Th ings Can Make a Big Diff erence 
(New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2000). See also Linda McQuaig & Neil Brooks, Th e 
Trouble with Billionaires (Toronto: Penguin Group, 2010) at 74.
41. For a discussion of the importance of cultural creativity, see Carys J Craig, Copyright, 
Communication and Culture: Towards a Relational Th eory of Copyright Law (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2011). See also Th omas Kuhn, Th e Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1962), and Rosemary J Coombe, Th e Cultural Life of Intellectual 
Properties: Authorship, Appropriation, and the Law (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998). 
42. McQuaig & Brooks, supra note 39 at 84 (quoting Isaac Newton). 
43. Supra note 1 at 19.
44. Ibid. 
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his most enduring contribution. Rarely has any IP scholar provided such clear 
insight on the Rawlsian philosophical conception of IP.45 
Th e misconception surrounding the nature of the Internet has given rise to 
absurd claims of the emergence of a new economy, the arrival of the information 
age, and with it, the exaggerated obituaries of the old economy. Th is froth has had 
more than mere philosophical repercussions. Although traditional IP doctrines 
are quickly declared moribund and every development in Internet and digital 
media is seemingly celebrated as a revolution, Merges pours a well-deserved bucket of 
cold water on the excessive hype that has captured the IP world. 
Clearly, Merges has succeeded in challenging much of the existing rhetoric 
in the IPRs regime. Th is book blazes several pathways through which IPRs can 
be charted with greater clarity. While some fundamental challenges in the IPRs 
regime remain, this book is a good aid for traversing the IPRs regime, especially 
as we contemplate the possibility of information feudalism. Although Merges 
deserves credit for his courage, the question of whether intellectual property can 
be justifi ed remains in doubt.
45. Rawls too bows before the temple of individual authorship and possessive individualism.
